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FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AT SERIOUS RISK:
THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE AFTER
JOHANNS V. LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASS'N
Mia Guizzetti Hayes'
Perhaps you've seen the advertising campaign announcing "Beef: It's
What's For Dinner." Is this an innocuous advertising slogan, or
something more insidious? Would your answer change if you knew that
the campaign was sponsored by the federal government? In 2005, the
Supreme Court heard Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, a First
Amendment challenge to generic beef advertisements. 2  The Court
determined that the beef advertisements at issue were government
speech, and therefore effectively immune from First Amendment
scrutiny? But dissenting Justice David Souter posed a lingering question:
if "[n]o one hearing a commercial for Pepsi or Levi's thinks Uncle Sam is
the man talking behind the curtain ... [w]hy would a person reading a
beef ad think Uncle Sam was trying to make him eat more steak?,
4
For thirty years, the Supreme Court has recognized advertising as a
category of speech that receives some protection under the First
Amendment.5 As it is generally understood, the commercial speech
category is composed of speech "with greater objectivity and hardiness"
that "'propose[s] a commercial transaction."' 6 However, application of
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1. 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).
2. Id. at 2058.
3. Id. at 2062-66.
4. Id. at 2072 (Souter, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.").
6. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
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the test for determining whether commercial speech may be regulated is
not altogether consistent.
7
What happens when the government compels individuals and
organizations to fund an advertising campaign that ostensibly is of
benefit to those private interests, but that in actuality promotes a
message with which they disagree? Can they elect not to fund the
disputed speech? In 1997, the Supreme Court decided that the
government could not compel funding of this sort, but in 2001, the Court
7. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA.
L. REV. 627, 634, 638-39 (1990). Some commentators have enumerated types of speech
that the Supreme Court does not consider commercial speech:
It is not speech that money is spent to project; if it were, all paid advertisements
would be commercial speech and the Court would run up against New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan and Buckley v. Valeo. It is not speech in a form sold for
profit; if it were, most books and newspapers would consist of commercial
speech. It is not speech that solicits money; if it were, the Court would be
contradicting a line of cases involving political and religious groups, cases like
NAACP v. Button and Cantwell v. Connecticut. It is not speech on a commercial
subject, or else business section editorials would be commercial speech; and it
isn't even factual speech on a commercial subject, or else business section news
reporting would be commercial speech.
Id. at 638 (footnotes omitted).
Other commentators have noted the necessity of distinguishing between commercial
speech and commercial communications, which do not necessarily enjoy the same First
Amendment protection. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1, 20 (2000). Commercial communications include the following:
[N]umerous communications among business executives about prices and
business practices now regulated by the Sherman Antitrust Act; communications
about working conditions and the like now regulated by the National Labor
Relations Act; representations about products and services now regulated by the
Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration;
representations about products now regulated by various consumer protection
laws, by the Uniform Commercial Code, and by the common law of warranty
and contract; statements about willingness to enter into a contract now regulated
by the common law of contract; and so on and on.
Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1184 (1988) (footnotes omitted). As Professor Post noted:
Whatever First Amendment protection the commercial communications within
this larger universe are entitled to receive, it is clear that they do not receive the
specific constitutional safeguards created by commercial speech doctrine.
[The c]ommercial speech doctrine is thus not merely about the boundary that
separates commercial speech from public discourse, but also about the boundary
that separates the category of "commercial speech" from the surrounding sea of
commercial communications that do not benefit from the protections of the
doctrine.
Post, supra, at 21.
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decided that the government could.8 No longer: with its 2005 decision in
Livestock Marketing Ass'n, the Court changed course yet again.9
Constitutional analysis of compelled funding of speech represents a
subset of First Amendment jurisprudence related to compelled speech. °
Conversely, the recently developed government speech doctrine suggests
that the usual modes of First Amendment scrutiny do not always apply
when the federal government is the speaker." Compelled subsidies and
government speech collided in Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 2 a case that
determined the constitutionality of government-sponsored advertising
campaigns for agricultural products funded via mandatory assessments
called checkoffs. 3
A checkoff program is a statutorily mandated advertising and
marketing effort, 4 and federal law directs the producers of various
commodities to execute these programs. 5 A checkoff is "the fixed, per-
unit fee that producers are required by [federal] law to pay into the
program each time they market a unit of the pertinent commodity.' 
16
Subject to federal approval that some have described as pro forma,17
8. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001); Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 477 (1997); see also Ian Heath Gershengorn,
Lingering Uncertainty, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 2005, at 8, 8 (discussing the Supreme Court's
recent vacillation when addressing First Amendment challenges to compelled subsidies).
9. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2065-66 (2005);
Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 8; see also Linda Greenhouse, In Free-Speech Ruling,
Justices Say All Ranchers Must Help Pay for Federal Ads, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at
A17 (discussing that the Court reached its decision "through a new analytical route that is
likely to end much of the courtroom conflict, if not the policy debate behind it").
10. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).
11. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 482 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 193-94, 197-99 (1991).
12. 125 S. Ct. at 2062.
13. Id. at 2058-59.
14. Cattlemen's Beef Promotion & Research Bd., Straight Answers to the Most
Frequently Asked Questions About National Checkoff Programs, http://www.beefboard.
org/Faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
15. See Agric. Mktg. Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Research and Promotion Programs,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/lsg/mpb/lsrp.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006) (stating that
checkoff programs "operate under promotion and research orders or agreements issued
by the Secretary of Agriculture and are financed by industry-established assessments").
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), checkoffs are
"requested, administered, and funded by the industries themselves." Id.
16. Bret Fox, Note, First Amendment Review of Beef Checkoff Assessments; Beef
May Be for Dinner, but May Producers Be Compelled To Say So? Livestock Marketing
Association v. United States Department of Agriculture, 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003), 4
Wyo. L. REV. 397,397 (2004).
17. E.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 553 U.S. 405, 417 (2001).
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checkoff funds "are utilized for research, promotion, and ... marketing
... of the commodity."
18
In Livestock Marketing Ass'n, the Supreme Court determined that
checkoff-funded advertising and marketing programs, like the one
responsible for the ubiquitous "Beef: It's What's for Dinner" campaign,
are tantamount to government speech, thus insulated from First
Amendment scrutiny. 9  Government speech results when the
government propounds a given message, either directly, when it speaks
itself, or indirectly, by funding a private speaker.' ° The government
speech doctrine is, effectively, an affirmative defense that shields the
government from First Amendment challenges. 2' This new rule may well
represent a bright line, shedding light on eight years worth of conflicting
Supreme Court jurisprudence related to checkoff programs, but the
22extent of this application is unclear.
This Comment will discuss why the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Livestock Marketing Ass'n represents a significant expansion of the
government speech doctrine and, possibly, a regressive development in
First Amendment jurisprudence. This Comment will track the evolution
of First Amendment jurisprudence related to government speech and
compelled subsidies leading up to the new, broad definition of what
constitutes government speech. This Comment will analyze the majority
and minority opinions in Livestock Marketing Ass'n through the lens of
the Supreme Court's earlier compelled subsidies jurisprudence in order
to determine how the Court intends to reconcile First Amendment rights
of private interests with the government interests that justify funding
commodities checkoff programs with compelled subsidies. Next, this
Comment will examine how the Livestock Marketing Ass'n Court
misapprehended its own recent jurisprudence. Specifically, this
Comment will argue that the majority incorrectly determined that an
advertising campaign promoting privately produced beef constitutes
government speech, even when the campaign is funded by assessments
that target a specific group for a specific purpose, and even when the
18. Fox, supra note 16, at 397. Checkoff programs fund promotional efforts for many
American commodities, including "beef, pork, soybean[s], wool/lamb, and mohair." Id.
The USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service "oversee[s] marketing agreements and
orders." Agric. Mktg. Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., An Overview of AMS Programs and
Services, http://www.ams.usda.gov/admin/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
19. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2058, 2062, 2066 (2005).
20. See Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and
Government Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (2004).
21. See Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 983, 989 (2005).
22. Greenhouse, supra note 9.
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government fails-or refuses-to identify itself as the proponent of the
message. This Comment will then explore the future of as-applied
challenges to the Beef Act and other checkoff-funded advertising
programs on compelled subsidy grounds. Finally, this Comment will
conclude, in accordance with the Livestock Marketing Ass'n dissent, that
if the government wishes to invoke the government speech doctrine, it
must ensure that listeners understand that the government itself is the
speaker.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS UNDERLYING THE GOVERNMENT
SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Compelled Subsidies and the Commercial Speech Backdrop
The Supreme Court's current commercial speech doctrine emerged
from the pivotal case Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission." The Supreme Court brought into sharper focus its
earlier determination that advertising is a quasi-protected category of
speech subject to fewer safeguards under the First Amendment than
24
other categories of speech . The Central Hudson Court declared that a
New York Public Service Commission regulation, which prohibited
public utilities from advertising their services, violated the utilities' First
25Amendment right to freely market their services.
The Central Hudson Court drew on prior decisions reinforcing the
protected status of commercial speech. In particular, the Court noted
that it had recognized that speech proposing a commercial transaction
23. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
24. See id. at 562-64; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court invalidated a state statute
designed to prevent licensed pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. Id. at
749-50, 770. The Supreme Court observed that consumers have an "interest in the free
flow of commercial information, that ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than [an]
interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763. In addition, society in
general has an interest in the free flow of information because "[e]ven an individual
advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public interest." Id. at
764. As such, the Court held that the government may not "completely suppress the
dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity." Id. at
773. In arriving at this decision, the Virginia Pharmacy Court also articulated a definition
of commercial speech and explained why commercial speech should receive "a different
degree of protection" (thus subject to intermediate scrutiny). See id. at 771 n.24. But see
id. at 781, 789-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that commercial speech is not
protected by the First Amendment, and that restraints on commercial speech are merely
forms of economic regulation within the ambit of legislative authority).
25. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558, 570-71.
2006]
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differs fundamentally from other protected categories of speech.26 As
such, the Court affirmed its prior determination that commercial speech
should be subject only to intermediate scrutiny, and articulated a four-
part test for establishing what constitutes regulable commercial speech.27
Pursuant to Central Hudson, the commercial speech at issue "must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading," the regulation at issue
that seeks to abridge speech must serve a substantial government
interest, the regulation must "directly advance the governmental interest
asserted," and the regulation must be no "more extensive than is
necessary to serve [the asserted government] interest."28
B. Compelled Subsidies and the Funding of Expressive Activities
Just as the First Amendment grants freedom to speak, it also grants
freedom not to be compelled to speak.29 Similarly, in addition to
recognizing a First Amendment freedom to associate, 3° the Supreme
Court has recognized a First Amendment freedom from association.31
32Accordingly, the government may not compel speech or association.
26. Id. at 562-63. The Central Hudson Court noted that previous Supreme Court
cases related to commercial speech
have recognized "the 'commonsense' distinction between speech proposing a
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation, and other varieties of speech." The Constitution
therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression. The protection available for particular
commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the
governmental interests served by its regulation.
Id. at 562-63 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
455-56 (1978)).
27. Id. at 564-66.
28. Id.
29. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). In Barnette,
the Supreme Court determined that under the First Amendment, the state could not
compel school children to recite the pledge of allegiance. Id. at 626-29; see also Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding that New Hampshire could not compel
citizens to display the state motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plates). In Wooley,
the Court found the mandated display of the state motto on license plates tantamount to
compelled speech, and recognized First Amendment protection of "the right of individuals
to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster ... an idea they
find morally objectionable." Id. at 715.
30. E.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) ("Our decisions
establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the
purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First... Amendment[].").
31. Id., at 234-36.
32. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 471-73 (1997).
[Vol. 55:795
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Whether the government may compel subsidies to fund speech depends
on the nature of the speech in question. 33
The Supreme Court addressed a constitutional challenge involving a
compelled contribution to a teachers' union in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education.4 In Abood, the Supreme Court considered whether the First
Amendment afforded freedom from association and freedom from
compelled subsidies to nonunion school employees who were required
under Michigan state law to pay a fee to the union that was equivalent to
members' union dues. 5 The Court reasoned that although a union may
use funds for "ideological causes not germane to" the activity for which
payment is compelled, the Constitution mandates "that such
expenditures be financed from ... dues .. paid by employees who do
not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing
SO."
36
Subsequently, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,37 the Supreme Court
heard a similar First Amendment challenge when a Michigan state
college's faculty union required nonmembers to pay a service fee
equivalent to dues paid by union members.3" Affirming its Abood
holding with particular emphasis on the germaneness element, the
Lehnert Court introduced a test to determine whether a challenged
expenditure violates the First Amendment rights of those who disagree
with it.39  Following Lehnert, a challenged expenditure must be
"germane" to the activity for which the funds are collected, "justified" by
a vital government interest, and the expenditure must "not significantly
add to the burdening of [the] free speech" interests of dissenters. 40 The
33. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 242
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
34. 431 U.S. 209, 212-13 (1997).
35. Id. at 211-13, 234-36. Some nonunion employees objected to this condition of
employment since the fees they paid funded not only collective bargaining, but also
political causes not related to collective bargaining activities. Id. at 213. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court announced that teachers "may constitutionally prevent the Union's
spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to
express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative." Id.
at 234.
36. Id. at 235-36. However, directing service fees toward funding collective
bargaining is germane to the purpose for which they were collected -funding union
activities-therefore this activity is permissible. See id. at 221-23.
37. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
38. Id. at 512-13.
39. Id. at 516-17, 519.
40. Id. at 519; cf Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
220-21 (2000). Student activities fees have provided ample fodder for compelled subsidies
challenges under the First Amendment. Id. at 221-23. In Southworth, the Supreme Court
held that a public university has a right to fund, via mandatory fees, certain student
2006]
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Supreme Court has sustained similar challenges related to the payment
of state bar dues and the use of state-government compelled subsidies to
fund political speech.4'
C. Government Speech and the Funding of Expressive Activities
When the government speaks, the Supreme Court has increasingly• 42
refrained from applying First Amendment scrutiny. According to the
Supreme Court, the rationale underlying the government speech doctrine
is "that 'when the government speaks, for instance to promote its own
policies or to advance a particular idea, it is . . .accountable to the
electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry
objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or
contrary position.' 43  In part because voters can ultimately decide
whether the architects of government speech will continue to have a
public voice, the Supreme Court has determined that government speech
is insulated from First Amendment scrutiny.44
activities espousing views to which students object as long as funds are allocated in a
viewpoint neutral manner. Id. at 221; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834-37 (1995) (holding that a university may not deny funding
to a student publication based on the viewpoints expressed in the publication); infra note
46.
41. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (holding that compulsory bar
dues may be used only to fund activities germane to the legal profession). The Court in
Keller concluded that a state bar association's message is not government speech. Id. at
10-13. The Livestock Marketing Association utilized this rationale to bolster its argument
that the checkoff program was not government speech. See Brief for the Respondents at
24-25, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005) (Nos. 03-1164, 03-
1165). The Livestock Marketing Association argued specifically:
Subsidies from the public fisc do not ... invariably suffice to insulate control
over the content of subsidized speech from First Amendment scrutiny. Rather,
they are necessary but not sufficient for a government speech defense to succeed.
When such subsidies are not given for the express purpose of promoting a
particular government message, but simply to create a forum for private speech
or to fund speech on behalf of some private person ... [courts have] refused to
recognize a government speech defense.
Id. at 25 n.13.
42. See Note, supra note 20, at 2411 & n.4.
43. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2001) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235).
44. Id. On numerous occasions over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has
considered how the government may regulate speech subsidized by general tax dollars. In
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), the Supreme
Court upheld a congressional regulation that forbade § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations
that engage in lobbying from receiving tax-deductible contributions but permitted §
501(c)(3) organizations that do not engage in lobbying to receive tax deductible
contributions. Id. at 543, 550. Pursuant to Taxation with Representation, the government
[Vol. 55:795
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1. Private Entities, Public Funds: The Government Speech Doctrine in
Rust v. Sullivan
A pivotal case in the relatively new jurisprudential arena of
government-funded speech is Rust v. Sullivan.45  Rust is particularly
important because although the decision did not specifically rely on the
government speech doctrine, it has been interpreted to clarify that when
private entities receive government funding to promote a government
message, the resulting speech is government speech, not private speech 6
In Rust, the Supreme Court held that the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) may, under Title X of the Public Health Service
Act, promulgate regulations to prohibit organizations receiving federal
funding from providing abortion counseling and referrals.47
The Rust Court determined that the First Amendment does not apply
to government funding of a private speaker as long as the government is
effectively the speaker. 8 The Court noted that the Public Health Service
may isolate specific groups to enjoy funding and tax benefits, provided that it does this in a
content-neutral fashion. See id. at 548-49.
However, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the
Court affirmed the district court's decision to overturn a provision of the Public
Broadcasting Act that prevented any broadcasting entity receiving federal funds via the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting from airing editorials. Id. at 366, 402. The Court
determined that although the tax-exempt status at issue in Taxation with Representation
was tantamount to a broad-based government subsidy, the government funding upon
which the FCC predicated a complete bar to editorializing might, in some instances, only
represent a small portion of a broadcaster's total budget. See id. at 399-401. The
restriction on editorializing did not represent the federal government's refusal to subsidize
certain speech, but rather an unconstitutional abridgement of protected speech. See id. at
402.
But the Court recognized a caveat to its content neutrality requirement when it heard
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998). The case arose in
response to a federal statutory amendment requiring the National Endowment for the
Arts (NEA) to adopt content-based guidelines to govern federal funding of the arts. Id.
The Supreme Court held that because, in functioning as a patron of the arts, the federal
government already made subjective determinations about the quality and content of
speech, considering the additional factors did not represent unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination. See id. at 585-87; Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum
and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 71, 103 (2004) ("In essence, under Finlay [sic], where a funding program
establishes some necessarily discretionary standard, such as 'excellence,' the government is
taking content into account in every funding decision, and doing so does not violate a
constitutional requirement of viewpoint neutrality.").
45. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
46. Velasquez, 531 U.S. at 541.
47. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-94.
48. See id. at 192-93. Moreover, "[t]he Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in
the public interest, without ... funding an alternative program." Id. at 193.
2006]
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Act's speech restrictions were only one component of a broader ban on
public funding of abortion-related activities.49 Accordingly, "when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is
entitled to define the limits of that program."5 °
2. Whose Speech is it, Anyway?: Limiting the Government Speech
Doctrine
The Supreme Court attempted to define the limits of the government
speech doctrine in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia,51 a case stemming from the University of Virginia's denial of
funding to a Christian evangelical student newspaper.52 The Court held
that the government speech doctrine did not apply to the University's
appropriation of mandatory student activities fees because the University
was using the funds not to advance its own message but "to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers."53 The Court determined that
because the University was funding private speech, it was required to do
so in a viewpoint neutral manner.54
The Supreme Court offered further clarification of the government
speech doctrine in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez" when it reasoned
that determining whether the funded speech is essentially public or
private is key to a government speech analysis.56 In Velazquez, the Court
invalidated a federal law preventing Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
from funding organizations that represented clients seeking "to challenge
welfare agency determinations of benefit ineligibility under
interpretations of existing law. 5 7 According to the Court, even though
LSC lawyers received government funding, they did not speak on behalf
of the government.58 The Court added that when the government elects
to promote a message via funding "'private entities to convey a
49. See id. at 189, 194.
50. Id. at 194.
51. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
52. See id. at 822-23, 825-26.
53. Id. at 834.
54. Id. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy suggested that the government's
duty to maintain viewpoint neutrality when funding private speech is particularly acute in
an academic setting. Id. at 835-36.
55. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
56. See id. at 542.
57. Id. at 536-38. The Court relied on Rust and Rosenberger in reaching its decision,
holding that "viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the
government is itself the speaker, or instances, like Rust," where the government conveyed
a message via a private entity. Id. at 541.
58. Id. at 542.
[Vol. 55:795
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governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to
ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.'"5 9
D. Compulsory Fees for Advertising in Checkoff Program Cases
1. Is the First Amendment Implicated at All?: Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. & Elliott
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of
commodities checkoff programs in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott.6° A five-to-four Court held that charging mandatory assessments
to fund generic advertisements for California tree fruit does not violate
the First Amendment rights of dissenting growers and handlers. 6' The
Glickman Court did not address whether the case implicated the
government speech doctrine because the government specifically
disclaimed reliance on this argument as a defense in its brief to the
Court.
62
Addressing the First Amendment issues raised, the Glickman Court
determined that the Ninth Circuit had erred in employing a commercial
speech analysis under Central Hudson.6' Furthermore, the Court
determined that a compelled speech analysis was not relevant. 64 Rather,
the Court found the appropriate inquiry in Abood's germaneness test,
and determined that the advertising program funded by compelled
65
subsidies "clearly satisfied" the germaneness requirement. The Court
noted that "Abood merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not
being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive
59. Id. at 541 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
60. 521 U.S. 457, 468 (1997).
61. Id. at 459-61, 477.
62. Brief for the Petitioner at *25 n.16, Glickman, 521 U.S. 457 (No. 95-1184), 1996
WL 494305. In its brief to the Court, the government emphasized that:
[U]nlike in the union and integrated-bar contexts, the constituency of the
governing body extends beyond those who contribute financially to its support.
Although producers must approve the adoption of a marketing order, that
condition does not detract from the status of the marketing order as a
governmental regulation.
In the court of appeals, the United States did not advance the argument that
the generic advertising supported by the system of assessments on handlers
constitutes "government speech" that does not implicate respondents' First
Amendment rights. We similarly do not rely on that argument in this Court as
an independent ground of decision.
Id. (citations omitted).
63. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 474.
64. Id. at 470.
65. See id. at 473.
2006]
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activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief.' ' 66  Because the
regulatory scheme embodied by the tree fruit checkoff program did not
interfere with the rights of individuals to hold core, non-economic
67 ,68beliefs, it did not "engender any crisis of conscience. Consequently,
the checkoff did not raise a First Amendment issue. 9  The Court
reasoned that the tree fruit checkoff program was merely "a species of
economic regulation that should enjoy the same strong presumption of
validity that we accord to other policy judgments made by Congress., 7
Accordingly, the Court determined that rational basis review was
appropriate, and upheld the tree fruit checkoff.
71
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Glickman found flaw with the
Court's reasoning that the marketing program funded by the checkoff
did not implicate a speech element "beyond what it sees as 'germane' to
the undoubtedly valid, nonspeech elements of the orders.
72
Additionally, Justice Souter disagreed with the proposition that a First
Amendment interest arises in a compelled subsidy context only when the
message at issue contains a political or ideological element.
73
66. Id. at 471.
67. See id. at 472. The Glickman majority determined that payment of the tree fruit
checkoff did not "interfere with the values lying at the 'heart of the First Amendment[-
]the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the




70. Id. at 477.
71. See id. at 476-77. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens asserted:
Three characteristics of the regulatory scheme at issue distinguish it from
laws that we have found to abridge the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment. First, the marketing orders impose no restraint on the freedom of
any producer to communicate any message to any audience. Second, they do not
compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech. Third, they do
not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological
views.
Id. at 469-70 (footnote omitted).
72. Id. at 477 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Souter further asserted:
The legitimacy of governmental regulation does not validate coerced subsidies
for speech that the government cannot show to be reasonably necessary to
implement the regulation, and the very reasons for recognizing that commercial
speech falls within the scope of First Amendment protection likewise justifies the
protection of those who object to subsidizing it against their will.
Id. at 477-78.
73. Id. at 477.
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2. A Compelled Subsidies About-Face: United States v. United Foods
In 2001, the Supreme Court heard United States v. United Foods,74
another case concerning the constitutionality of mandatory checkoff
programs." This case presented the Court with an issue similar to that
raised in Glickman.76 In United Foods, fresh mushroom handlers were
unwilling to pay a required checkoff to fund promotional messages
devised by the Mushroom Council.77 Despite the similarity of issues
before the Court, the United Foods Court did not view Glickman as
controlling.78
As in Glickman, the United Foods Court did not discuss whether
government speech was at issue. 79 Rather, the Court looked to Abood
and its progeny.80 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy announced
that the mushroom checkoff constituted impermissible compelled
speech.8' In an effort to preserve the economic regulation rationale that
it had advanced four years earlier, the Court distinguished Glickman.
74. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
75. Id. at 408.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 408-09.
78. See id. at 415-16; William Conner Eldridge, Note, United States v. United Foods:
United We Stand, Divided We Fall-Arguing the Constitutionality of Commodity Checkoff
Programs, 56 ARK. L. REV. 147, 175-76 (2003).
79. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416-17. The Court noted that the government raised
the government speech defense in its petition for certiorari, but not before the Sixth
Circuit. Id. at 416. In failing to timely raise the issue, the Court observed that the
government "deprived respondent of the ability to address significant matters that might
have been difficult points for the Government. For example, although the government
asserts that advertising is subject to approval by the Secretary of Agriculture, respondent
claims the approval is pro forma." Id. at 416-17. Ultimately, the government could not
argue that the checkoff-funded mushroom advertising was government speech, since the
Court declined to "allow a petitioner to assert new substantive arguments attacking, rather
than defending, the judgment [of the court of appeals] when those arguments were not
pressed in the court whose opinion we are reviewing." Id. at 417.
80. See id. at 413. Justice Kennedy observed:
A proper application of the rule in Abood requires us to invalidate the instant
statutory scheme. Before addressing whether a conflict with freedom of belief
exists, a threshold inquiry must be whether there is some state imposed
obligation which makes group membership less than voluntary; for it is only the
overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for speech
in the first place.
Id.
81. Id. According to Justice Kennedy, the mushroom checkoff was "contrary to the
First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which
include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of
the group by law or necessity." Id. But see id. at 425 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the checkoff program "does not compel speech itself; it compels the payment of money").
Consequently, Justice Breyer argued, no First Amendment interest was implicated. Id.
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The Court noted that the marketing order for the California tree fruit
industry at issue in Glickman was "ancillary to a more comprehensive
program restricting marketing autonomy, 8 2 while the advertising
supported by the mushroom checkoff at issue in United Foods "far from
being ancillary, is the principal object of the regulatory scheme." '83 The
Court further noted that although "the rationale of Abood extends to the
party who objects to the compelled support for this speech," in the
absence of a broader regulatory scheme, there was no basis upon which
to evaluate whether the compelled speech was germane to a legitimate
governmental purpose.8 5
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion relied upon the Court's Glickman
decision that checkoff-funded collective advertising did not implicate a
First Amendment concern.86 The dissent recognized no meaningful
distinction between regulatory schemes driving the advertising at issue in
87Glickman and the advertising at issue in United Foods. Moreover, the
dissent echoed the Glickman majority's assertion that a checkoff
program is "incapable of 'engender[ing] any crisis of conscience"'
82. Id. at 411 (majority opinion).
83. Id. at 411-12; see also Eldridge, supra note 78, at 175 (arguing that the United
Foods decision does not draw a bright-line of per se unconstitutionality for all checkoff
programs, and that checkoff programs which devote a significant portion of funds
collected to research and other nonpromotional activities are those most likely to pass
constitutional muster under United Foods).
84. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415-16.
85. Id. Following the Livestock Marketing Ass'n decision, the Mushroom Council
announced that it would resume collecting assessments for advertising and promotional
activities in early 2006. Robert Vosburgh, Mushroom Council To Restart Promotional
Activities, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Oct. 3, 2005, at 54, 54. The Mushroom Council was
forced to curtail checkoff-funded advertising in the wake of the United Foods decision.
See id. In the years between United Foods and Livestock Marketing Ass'n, the Mushroom
Council was forced to limit its activities to industry research and development of best
practices. Id.
86. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 419-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Id. Justice Breyer argued that
[s]everal features of the program indicate that its speech-related aspects, i.e.,
its compelled monetary contributions, are necessary and proportionate to the
legitimate promotional goals that it seeks .... [because] compelled contributions
may be necessary to maintain a collective advertising program in that rational
producers would otherwise take a free ride on the expenditures of others.
Id. at 429. In addition, Justice Breyer argued that "those features of the program that led
[Glickman's] dissenters to find its program disproportionately restrictive are absent here."
Id. at 430. Furthermore, Justice Breyer argued that even if the advertising program at
issue did constitute commercial speech, not merely an element of a system of economic
regulation, it would still pass constitutional muster under a commercial speech analysis
pursuant to Central Hudson. Id. at 428-29.
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because no political or ideological values are at stake. Since no core
beliefs were at issue, Justice Breyer reasoned, the germaneness test of
the Abood line of cases was inapplicable. 9 Ultimately, Justice Breyer
determined that Central Hudson provided the appropriate test, and that
the mushroom checkoff and attendant promotional efforts would pass
intermediate First Amendment scrutiny.9
E. Challenges to the Beef Act
Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's compelled subsidy
decisions, the Livestock Marketing Association, a trade association
representing livestock markets, initiated a challenge to the Beef Act that
reached the Supreme Court.91  Livestock Marketing Association
members took issue with the generic advertising messages ascribed to
"America's Beef Producers." 92 They argued that the targeted checkoff
and the resultant advertising campaign constituted compelled
commercial speech and abridged their First Amendment right not to
subsidize private speech with which they disagreed. 93
88. Id. at 423 (alteration in original) (quoting Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,
521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997)).
89. See id. at 422-23. The dissent found a fundamental difference from the Abood
line of cases since compelled contributions in those instances "were unlawful ... to the
extent that they helped fund subsidiary activities of the organization, i.e., activities other
than those that legally justified a compelled contribution; and ... because the subsidiary
activities in question were political activities that might 'conflict with one's "freedom of
belief .... Id. at 423 (quoting Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471).
90. See id. at 429.
91. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2059 (2005). The
Livestock Marketing Association "began as a grass roots organization dedicated to
providing auction marketers with access to the latest industry information and a voice in
federal and state government." Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, History, http://www.lmaweb.com/
lmahistory.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). Additionally, it "carries out a strong, active
government relations program [and has] [a] full-time, experienced vice president for
government and industry affairs [who] work[s] with LMA's region executive officers [to]
handle[] government and industry representation for LMA member businesses."
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, Government Representation, http://www.lmaweb.comllma
government.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
92. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 1-2 & 1 n.2; Andrew Martin,
Ranchers Have Beef with Meat Ads, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2004, at 21. Livestock Marketing
Association members, who sell cattle but not beef, objected that the checkoff subsidizes
only advertising efforts that support meatpackers and retailers, not livestock marketers.
Id. Moreover, they asserted that the checkoff "also benefits foreign competitors because
it promotes consumption of all beef, rather than just that produced by ranchers in the
United States." Id.
93. See Martin, supra note 92. As the Livestock Marketing Association argued:
The promotions issued pursuant to the Beef Act are generic in character-
meaning that, among other things, they do not distinguish between the grain-fed
U.S. beef produced by respondents and the grass-fed beef produced abroad,
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1. Background: History of the Beef Promotion and Research Act
Congress established the beef checkoff in 1985 with the passage of the
Beef Promotion and Research Act (Beef Act).94 Key provisions of the
Beef Act created a federal policy of promoting the marketing and
consumption of beef and beef products.95 Under the Beef Act, Congress
directed the Secretary of Agriculture to issue a Beef Promotion and
Research Order (Order) to establish and implement a checkoff program
96
to fund research and marketing activities .
which respondents regard as inferior. Respondents object to this simplistic "beef
is good" message, which obscures the quality differences between U.S. and
foreign beef. Beyond the economic perversity of being forced to promote their
foreign competition, respondents object to the fact that the promotions are
expressly attributed to them through messages, which appear in each television
and print advertisement, identifying the ads as "funded by America's Beef
Producers." And because respondents, like many cattle producers, place a
premium on their independence from the government and its controls and
exactions, they are especially offended to the degree that these messages are
deemed "governmental" in character.
Respondents also object to being forced to associate for expressive purposes
with the various organizations, ranging from wholly private to quasi-
governmental in nature, involved in collecting and spending their checkoff
dollars ....
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 2 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
94. Beef Promotion and Research Act (Beef Act) of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99
Stat. 1597 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901 -2911 (2000)). Congress passed the
Beef Act as part of a broader piece of legislation, the Food Security Act of 1985. See Food
Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985). The congressional findings
underlying the Beef Act included the dietary value of beef and beef products, the
importance of beef to the national economy, the need to market beef efficiently, and the
need to maintain and expand existing markets for beef. See 7 U.S.C. § 2901(a).
Accordingly, Congress adopted the following policy:
[Ilt is in the public interest to authorize the establishment . . . of an orderly
procedure for financing (through assessments on all cattle sold in the United
States and on cattle, beef, and beef products imported into the United States)
and carrying out a coordinated program of promotion and research designed to
strengthen the beef industry's position in the marketplace and to maintain and
expand domestic and foreign markets and uses for beef and beef products.
Id. § 2901(b).
95. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901(a)(3), 2904(4)(B), (6).
96. Id. § 2903. The Beef Act provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Secretary [of Agriculture] shall publish such proposed order and give due
notice and opportunity for public comment on such proposed order. Such
proposal may be submitted by any organization meeting the requirements for
certification under section 2905 of this title or any interested person, including
the Secretary.
• . . After notice and opportunity for public comment are given . . . the
Secretary shall issue a beef promotion and research order. The order shall
become effective not later than one hundred and twenty days following
publication of the proposed order.
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Pursuant to the Order, the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to
create the Cattleman's Beef Promotion and Research Board (Beef
Board), a self-regulating body composed of beef producers and
importers.9 7 The 108-member Beef Board is responsible for collecting
the checkoff, currently set at one dollar per head of cattle for domestic
producers, and disbursing the funds.98 More than half of the money
raised via the beef checkoff funds generic advertising messages, including
the "Beef: It's What's for Dinner" campaign. 99 In a 1988 referendum, a
majority of beef producers voted to continue the checkoff program,"3
and it has remained in place since that time under the Beef Board's
stewardship. 0'
2. Lower Court Challenges to the Beef Act After United Foods
Following the Supreme Court's United Foods decision, a challenge to
the Beef Act surfaced in Livestock Marketing Ass'n v. United States
Department of Agriculture.'O' In Livestock Marketing Ass'n, the United
States District Court for the District of South Dakota considered the
Livestock Marketing Association's First Amendment challenge to the
Beef Act and declared the Act's mandatory checkoff unconstitutional
Id.
97. Id. § 2904(1); see also Cattlemen's Beef Promotion & Research Bd., Who We
Are, http://www.beefboard.org/whoweare.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). The website
describes the history, composition, and responsibilities of the Beef Board:
Each of the Beef Board members are appointed by the Secretary of
Agriculture from nominations submitted by certified nominating organizations.
The nominating organizations represent beef and dairy producers in each state
or region. Thirty-seven states have individual members serving on the Board.
The remainder of states are divided into three regions. Importer appointments
are drawn from nominations by importer associations.
Id.
98. See Cattlemen's Beef Promotion & Research Bd., supra note 97 ("[T]he checkoff
is collected by qualified state beef councils, which retain up to 50 cents on the dollar. The
state councils forward the other 50 cents per head to the Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and
Research Board, which oversees the national checkoff program, subject to USDA
review.").
99. See id.; Cattlemen's Beef Promotion & Research Bd., Beef Checkoff Programs,
http://www.beefboard.org/checkoffprograms.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2006); see also
Tony Mauro, Justices Settle Beef Over Meat Ads, LEGAL TIMES, May 30, 2005, at 12, 12.
("Fees from the beef program have amounted to more than $80 million a year and go
toward scientific research as well as advertising.").
100. See Cattlemen's Beef Promotion & Research Bd., supra note 97 ("The checkoff
assessment became mandatory when the program was approved by 79 percent of
producers in a 1988 national referendum vote.").
101. See id.
102. 207 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D.S.D. 2002), affd, 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003), vacated sub
nom. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).
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"because it requires plaintiffs to pay, in part, for speech to which the
plaintiffs object. ' '  The court further determined that compelled
financial support of government beef promotion was not within the
ambit of the government speech doctrine.""
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
Livestock Marketing Ass'n on appeal. 5 In upholding the district court's
decision, the Eighth Circuit relied in part on the Supreme Court's
decisions in Glickman and United Foods to determine that "the Beef Act
and the Beef Order are unconstitutional and unenforceable." ' 06 Unlike
the district court, which declined to employ the Central Hudson
commercial speech analysis, the Eighth Circuit considered "whether the
governmental interest in the commercial advertising under the Beef Act
is sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement upon appellees' First
Amendment right not to be compelled to subsidize that commercial
speech."'0 7  The Court modified the Central Hudson test to fit a
compelled subsidy scenario, and determined that "the government's
interest in protecting the welfare of the beef industry by compelling all
beef producers and importers to pay for generic beef advertising is not
sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement on appellees' First
103. Id. at 1002.
104. Id. at 1005-06. Livestock Marketing Ass'n and the lower court cases that preceded
it were not the first challenges to the constitutionality of mandatory checkoffs under the
Beef Act. In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard United
States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989), in which it affirmed a district court ruling
that the Beef Act's checkoff and advertising programs did not violate the beef producers'
First Amendment rights to be free from compelled speech and compelled association. Id.
at 1134, 1136-37. The Third Circuit reasoned that advertising campaigns undertaken
pursuant to the Beef Act did not constitute government speech and did not contravene the
First Amendment when the government had a compelling purpose for "the slight
incursion on" free speech and association rights. Id. at 1132-34. According to the Third
Circuit, the Beef Act was ideologically neutral and represented the least restrictive means
available to the government to achieve its compelling purpose of promoting the American
beef industry. Id. at 1137; see also Joseph Wilhelm, Note, Compelled Commercial Speech
Under the Beef Promotion Act Should Be Impermissible: United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d
1119 (3d Cir. 1989), 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1034-37 (1991) (discussing the Frame court's
treatment of the government speech doctrine).
105. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 726 (8th Cir. 2003),
vacated sub nom. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005). For another
case with a similar disposition, see Michigan Pork Producers Ass'n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d
157, 159 (6th Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Michigan Pork Pullers Ass'n v. Campaign for
Family Farms, 125 S. Ct. 2511 (2005). In Michigan Pork Pullers Ass'n, the Sixth Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United Foods to invalidate a checkoff program
for pork that was issued pursuant to the Pork Promotion, Research and Consumer
Information Act, and the resulting Pork Promotion Order. Id. at 159.
106. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 725-26.
107. Id. at 716, 723 (footnote omitted).
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Amendment free speech right."1 °8 Thus, according to the Eighth Circuit,
the beef checkoff could not withstand even intermediate scrutiny.0 9
3. Turning United Foods on its Head: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Ass'n
Enjoined by the Eight Circuit from enforcing the Beef Act's checkoff
program, the government petitioned for certiorari.11 In 2004, the
Supreme Court granted the government's petition " ' and heard oral
arguments in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n that December.
1 2
The Court decided the case the following spring, vacating the decision of
the Eighth Circuit and remanding the case for further proceedings."3
108. Id. at 725-26.
109. See id. at 722-23, 725-26.
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (No.
03-1164), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/2pet/7pet/2003-1164.pet.aa.pdf.
111. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, cert. granted sub nom. Veneman v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 541 U.S. 1062 (2004) (No. 03-1164). By the time the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, President Bush had nominated Mike Johanns to replace Ann
Veneman as Secretary of Agriculture. See Richard W. Steveson & Christopher Drew,
Bush Set To Name Ex-Head of Police for Security Post, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at Al.
The Supreme Court also granted certiorari in Nebraska Cattlemen v. Livestock Marketing
Ass'n, 541 U.S. 1062 (2004) (No. 03-1165). This companion case was joined with Johanns
v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2055. In Nebraska
Cattlemen, Chief Justice of the United States John Roberts argued on behalf of petitioners
Nebraska Cattlemen and two South Dakota beef producers while in private practice as a
partner at Hogan & Hartson LLP. See Court Nominee John Roberts Knows Checkoffs,
BEEF, Sept. 2005, at 7, 7. He asserted on behalf of the petitioners that checkoff-funded
advertising was government speech not subject to review under the First Amendment. Id.
Relying on the Supreme Court's United Foods decision, the Eighth Circuit panel ruled in
favor of the Livestock Marketing Association. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 725-
26.
112. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2055; see also Martin supra note 92, at 21.
113. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2055, 2066. Remanded proceedings to
determine the constitutionality under the First Amendment of checkoff programs as
applied to the Livestock Marketing Association and similarly situated groups were still
pending, at the time of writing, in Livestock Marketing Ass'n and several other related
cases. See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court, Certiorari-Summary Dispositions (May 31, 2005),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/053105pzor.pdf. Following its decision
in Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, then summarily reversed
and remanded five checkoff cases on its docket. See id. The Ninth Circuit held in
abeyance an additional beef checkoff case, Charter v. United States Department of
Agriculture, 412 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2005), pending the Supreme Court's Livestock
Marketing Ass'n decision. Id. at 1019. Following Livestock Marketing Ass'n, the Ninth
Circuit remanded Charter to the United States District Court for the District of Montana,
id. at 1019-20, and on November 1, 2005, the case was dismissed and Judge Richard
Cebull's previous order requiring payment of the checkoff was reinstated. Nat'l
Cattlemen's Beef Ass'n, Charter Challenge Dismissed, http://www.beef.org/NEWSCharter
ChallengeDismissed24200.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
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While Livestock Marketing Ass'n was the third case in eight years to
assess the constitutionality of a federal checkoff program under the First
Amendment, it was the first to successfully raise the issue of whether the
advertising funded by such a program constituted government speech.
1 14
The respondents in Livestock Marketing Ass'n argued that the generic
promotional messages funded by the beef checkoff conflicted with their
efforts to promote specific brands and types of American beef."'
Moreover, the respondents objected to "being forced to associate for
expressive purposes with the various organizations, ranging from wholly
private to quasi-governmental in nature, involved in collecting and
spending their checkoff dollars" when those organizations espoused
marketing messages in direct conflict with those of the Livestock
Marketing Association.116  In a five-to-four decision, the Court
broadened its definition of government speech to determine that
checkoff-funded advertising for agricultural products indeed constituted
government speech, and, as a result, was "exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny.', 117 The Court determined that it was of no consequence that
the Beef Board collected checkoff funds through "a targeted assessment
. . . rather than by general [tax] revenues."... Moreover, the Court
indicated that as long as the Beef Board's enabling statute, the Beef Act,
did not require that the government identify itself as the speaker, the
absence of attribution did not preclude the government speech defense."9
114. See Mauro, supra note 99, at 12.
115. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 1-2. The Livestock Marketing
Association's brief noted the inherent breadth of the checkoff-funded beef
advertisements, asserting:
The promotions issued pursuant to the Beef Act are generic in character -
meaning that, among other things, they do not distinguish between the grain-fed
U.S. beef produced by respondents and the grass-fed beef produced abroad,
which respondents regard as inferior. Respondents object to this simplistic "beef
is good" message, which obscures the quality differences between U.S. and
foreign beef.
Id. at 2.
116. Id. at 2-3. The Livestock Marketing Association's brief noted that "NCBA [the
National Cattlemen's Beef Association], in particular, takes partisan political positions -
endorsing President Bush's reelection, for example. No discernable attribution difference,
other than a check-mark graphic that is meaningless to the public, distinguishes the
checkoff-funded promotions from NCBA's political messages, which are purportedly not
funded by the checkoff .... Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
117. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2057-58, 2065-66.
118. Id. at 2063; see also HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 95-
815 A, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 26,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf (last updated May 24, 2005).
119. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2064 n.7.
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II. THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IN FocuS: COMPETING
PARADIGMS IN JOHANNS V. LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASS'N
Compelled funding of private speech raises First Amendment
concerns, but, following Livestock Marketing Ass'n, compelled funding of
government speech does not raise those issues.20  The Livestock
Marketing Ass'n Court made this determination by accepting the
government speech defense proffered by the federal petitioner.
1 21
However, the primary dissent, authored by Justice Souter, took issue
with the majority's willingness to consider checkoff-funded advertising
government speech.1 22 The dissent concluded that the government must
clearly identify itself as the speaker in order to invoke the defense,
particularly when a targeted assessment rather than a general tax funds
the speech at issue.
1 23
A. The Livestock Marketing Ass'n Majority
The Livestock Marketing Ass'n Court correctly declined to apply the
124Central Hudson test in a compelled subsidies context, recognizing,
perhaps, that a commercial speech analysis is appropriate for speech that
proposes a commercial transaction, such as buying prescription drugs at a
discounted price or buying a particular brand of cigarette. As the
Livestock Marketing Association argued, the beef advertisements at
issue did no such thing. 1 6 Thus, the facts of Livestock Marketing Ass'n
120. Id. at 2063.
121. Id. at 2060, 2062-63, 2066.
122. Id. at 2068-69 (Souter, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 2060-62 (majority opinion) (illustrating how the Court used compelled
speech cases in its analysis of the constitutionality of the beef checkoff); see also id. at 2074
n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that "Central Hudson scrutiny is not appropriate in a
case involving compelled speech and that even if some relaxed standard of review
analogous to Central Hudson were employed the Beef Act would not survive it").
125. Id. at 260-62 (majority opinion); see also Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41,
at 37, 45 (urging the Court to reject a commercial speech analysis); Post, supra note 7, at 6,
15-25 (discussing the defining characteristics of public discourse, commercial speech, and
commercial communication).
126. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 45. Rather, as the Livestock
Marketing Association asserted in its brief to the Court, the messages "that beef is
delicious and is 'what's for dinner' hardly represent objective statements comparable, for
example, to the price of a product at a particular store." Id.
In its petition for certiorari in Livestock Marketing Ass'n, the government described the
checkoff as a vehicle for public safety awareness, stating that in addition to using the
checkoff to fund generic advertising, the Beef Board has used checkoff revenue:
[F]or other sorts of promotion, such as contacts with retailers, as well as research,
education, and information projects on such important matters as BSE, or "mad
cow disease," and E. coli bacteria. Especially at a time of increasing public
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did not fit the rationale underpinning the Central Hudson rubric.2 7 It
necessarily follows that the crux of the compelled subsidies challenge in
Livestock Marketing Ass'n was not the commercial nature of the speech
at issue, but the right of dissenters not to speak or fund speech.' 2
The Livestock Marketing Ass'n majority responded to the germaneness
conundrum by declining to apply the murky AboodlLehnert standard.9
While the United Foods Court relied principally on cases related to
speech compelled by private entities,3 the Livestock Marketing Ass'n
Court dispensed with the compelled subsidy analysis entirely. 3' The
Lehnert test that grew out of Abood's germaneness principle is fairly
straightforward: "[c]hallenged expenditures must be germane to a vital
governmental interest and not significantly add to the burden on
dissenters' free speech interests inherent in the program. '  But the
Lehnert Court offered no clarification of the slippery germaneness
standard, nor did it address precisely which free speech interests a
compelled subsidy burdens."33
Glickman and United Foods further confused the compelled subsidies
analysis by straying from the Lehnert test and adding more questions to
the mix: "[w]hether the disputed activities [implicate a political or
ideological concern that] might cause a crisis of conscience and whether
compelled payments also fund non-expressive activities .... [as] part of a
broader regulatory program.' 34 In its quest to resolve an increasingly
muddled and unworkable standard for compelled subsidies, the
Livestock Marketing Ass'n Court selected a new solution to an old
problem: the government speech doctrine.'
concern about food safety and nutrition issues, there is no justification for the
evisceration of the Beef Act ordered by the courts below.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 110, at 29-30 (citation omitted).
127. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 45. In addition, the respondents
noted that "the objective verifiability of a category of speech" should not be relevant to a
compelled subsidies analysis. Id.
128. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2064 n.7; Mauro, supra note 99, at 12 ("By
classifying [the beef checkoff] as government speech, the majority sidestepped commercial
speech issues that have made for more-complicated rulings in past cases.").
129. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2061-62.
130. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410, 413-16 (2001).
131. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2060-62.
132. Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1108 (2005); see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991).
133. Klass, supra note 132, at 1108; see also Note, supra note 20, at 2425-26 (criticizing
the germaneness standard).
134. Klass, supra note 132, at 1108-09 (footnote omitted). See also Note, supra note
20, at 2421-22 (describing the standards used in Glickman and United Foods).
135. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2062-63.
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Writing for the majority,36 Justice Scalia offered the fact that the Beef
Board must answer to the Secretary of Agriculture as evidence that
"[t]he message set out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end
the message established by the Federal Government., 137 Moreover, that
the very existence of the Beef Order, the Beef Board, and attendant
advertising campaign was congressionally-mandated was further
rationale for classifying the advertisements as government speech.
3 8
Therefore, as Justice Scalia reasoned, the advertisements in dispute were
government speech, and the Livestock Marketing Association could not
sue the government under the First Amendment. 9 The Livestock
Marketing Ass'n majority found it immaterial that the advertising
campaign was funded by private money, and that it resulted from a
targeted assessment rather than a general tax.' 4
136. Id. at 2058. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Thomas, and Breyer. Id. at 2057.
137. Id. at 2062. The majority also noted that "the record demonstrates that the
Secretary exercises final approval authority over every word used in every promotional
campaign. All proposed promotional messages are reviewed by Department officials ....
[Olfficials of the Department also attend and participate in the open meetings at which
proposals are developed." Id. at 2063 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 2062-64.
139. Id. at 2063-66.
140. Id. at 2063. Three Justices offered brief concurrences. Id. at 2066-68 (concurring
opinions). Justice Thomas found no meaningful difference between government speech
funded by a general tax and government speech funded by a targeted assessment. Id. at
2066 (Thomas, J., concurring). Moreover, he found no compelled association because the
checkoff-funded advertisements did not "objectively associate their message with any
individual respondent." Id. at 2067.
Justice Breyer revived the spirit of his United Foods dissent in which he urged that "the
challenged assessments involved a form of economic regulation, not speech." Id. at 2067
(Breyer, J., concurring). While he found the government speech rationale acceptable, he
joined the majority opinion "[w]ith the caveat that . .. my dissent in United Foods offers a
preferable approach." Id.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the Court's judgment but did not agree that the
"Beef: It's What's For Dinner" advertising campaign's promotion of beef consumption
was government speech given the fact that, via the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and the USDA's Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2005 (Dietary
Guidelines), the government has clearly espoused an opposite view, advising Americans to
limit their beef intake. Id. at 2067-68 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg found the checkoff to "qualify as permissible economic
regulation." Id. at 2068.
Indeed, the Dietary Guidelines recommend a diet low in saturated fat and trans fat,
both of which can be found in beef. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS, 2005, at 29-34 (2005),
http://www.health.gov/dietaryguidelines/dga2005/document/pdf/dga2005.pdf. The Dietary
Guidelines cite beef as a prevalent source of saturated fat in American diets, second only
to cheese. Id. at 33 tbl.10. Moreover, the Dietary Guidelines isolate beef as a primary
source of harmful trans fats:
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The Livestock Marketing Ass'n majority asserted that because neither
the Beef Act nor the Beef Order require the government to identify itself
as the speaker in checkoff-funded advertising, the government need not
do so, and the attribution issue was moot.1 4 ' This rationale, according to
Justice Scalia, was sufficient to overrule the district court's facial
invalidation of the statute.42  Justice Scalia noted that if the respondent
had alleged that listeners erroneously attributed the "Beef: It's What's
For Dinner" to the Livestock Marketing Association rather than to the
government, then "the analysis would be different.' ' 43  However, he
dismissed the notion that clear identification of the government as the
speaker was a threshold issue critical to the government speech
analysis.144
B. The Primary Livestock Marketing Ass'n Dissent
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy,
Justice Souter found the facts of the case to be substantially similar to
those at issue in United Foods.1 46 Justice Souter further argued that the
court of appeals correctly held that the Supreme Court's decision in
United Foods made the Beef Act's mandatory checkoff
unconstitutional. 47 Justice Souter noted that while United Foods did not
reach the government speech defense, because the mushroom checkoff
Trans fatty acids, or trans fats, are unsaturated fatty acids that contain at least
one non-conjugated double bond in the trans configuration. Sources of trans
fatty acids include hydrogenated/partially hydrogenated vegetable oils that are
used to make shortening and commercially prepared baked goods, snack foods,
fried foods, and margarine. Trans fatty acids also are present in foods that come
from ruminant animals (e.g., cattle and sheep). Such foods include dairy
products, beef, and lamb.
Id. at 69.
141. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2064 n.7.
142. Id. at 2064-65.
143. Id. at 2064 n.7. An "as-applied" challenge alleges unconstitutionality of a statute
based on its application in a specific instance or based on the specific facts of a given case,
whereas a facial challenge, as in Livestock Marketing Ass'n, considers the overall
constitutionality of the statute. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (8th ed. 2005).
144. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2064 n.7.
145. Id. at 2068 (Souter, J., dissenting). In addition to joining Justice Souter, Justice
Kennedy issued a brief separate dissent in which he wrote that he "would reserve for
another day the difficult First Amendment questions that would arise if the government
were to target a discrete group of citizens to pay even for speech that the government does
,embrace as publicly as it speaks."' Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2073
(Souter, J., dissenting)).
146. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 2070 (asserting that "these cases are factually on all fours with United
Foods").
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in United Foods was similar to the beef checkoff at issue, the beef ads
were not government speech.
148
Particularly troubling to Justice Souter was the fact that the "Beef: It's
What's for Dinner" advertising campaign concealed its government
funding because the advertisements touted sponsorship "'by America's
Beef Producers.' ' 49 Justice Souter found the majority's willingness to
employ the government speech defense erroneous not because of any
inherent flaw in the defense, but because the government failed to
identify itself as the speaker.5  In Justice Souter's view, without accurate
identification of the source of the speech, the government is not
accountable; without government accountability, there is no government
speech to enjoy immunity from First Amendment analysis.'
148. Id.
149. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2072 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 2068. Justice Souter expressed:
The Court accepts the defense unwisely. The error is not that government
speech can never justify compelling a subsidy, but that a compelled subsidy
should not be justifiable by speech unless the government must put that speech
forward as its own. Otherwise there is no check whatever on government's power
to compel special speech subsidies, and the rule of United Foods is a dead letter.
I take the view that if government relies on the government-speech doctrine to
compel specific groups to fund speech with targeted taxes, it must make itself
politically accountable by indicating that the content actually is a government
message, not just the statement of one self-interested group the government is
currently willing to invest with power. Sometimes, as in these very cases,
government can make an effective disclosure only by explicitly labeling the
speech as its own. Because the Beef Act fails to require the Government to show
its hand, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding the Act
unconstitutional ....
Id. at 2068-69.
Although Justice Breyer did not address attribution in his concurring opinion, at oral
arguments he also appeared to support transparency when the government asserts the
government speech defense. See Martin, supra note 92, at 21 ("Justice Stephen Breyer
suggested that the issue might be resolved by changing the tagline at the bottom of the
beef ads to make it clear that the government endorses it.").
151. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2068-69; see also Randall P. Benzanson &
William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1484-85
(2001) (discussing how the government speech doctrine should be limited); Lee, supra
note 21, at 1052 (arguing that unless a reasonable recipient can easily recognize that the
government is the source of the speech at issue, the government should not be permitted
to assert a government speech defense). Professors Benzanson and Buss assert that the:
[G]overnment is quite capable of both detecting expressive meanings given to its
acts and either disclaiming them or, if on reflection the government wishes to
adopt them as its own message, taking steps to do so explicitly and formally.
Requiring that government take positive action to adopt a message as its own
would avoid the limitlessness and ambiguity of the attribution determination,
substituting for it the more manageable and conventional criterion of
government purpose. Government speech, in other words, would occur only
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Additionally, Justice Souter distinguished government-sponsored
speech funded by a targeted assessment, like the checkoff, from
government speech funded by a general tax.152  According to Justice
Souter, when the government funds speech with a general tax, the link
between the speech and the compelled funding is sufficiently
attenuated. 153  However, when the government funds speech via a
targeted subsidy, the speech at issue usually has a direct relationship to
the activities of the targeted group.1 4 Ultimately, Justice Souter urged
that when the government targets a specific group to pay a tax for a
specific purpose, it must take special care to ensure that those affected
can utilize the democratic process in a meaningful way when they
disagree with a message they must subsidize.
1 55
C. A Livestock Marketing Ass'n Postscript: Government Speech, Pending
Cases, and Pending Legislation
Both the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the
Beef Board applauded the Supreme Court's decision in Livestock
Marketing Ass'n, 56 while the Livestock Marketing Association and other
when the purpose of the government action is expressive and the message is
identified by the government, not by third parties. . . . Intent, message, and
interpretation ...must coincide for an act to qualify as an act of expression
under the First Amendment.
There is no obvious reason why government speech should be exempt from
such a rule or definition. Indeed, in view of the dangerous breadth and
ambiguity of speech by attribution, and its consequences of displacement of
private speech, there is every reason to make government action, in particular,
subject to the rigorous application of such a rule.
Benzanson & Buss, supra, at 1484-85 (footnotes omitted).
152. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2071 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter
further described how a democracy "ensures that government is not untouchable when its
speech rubs against the First Amendment interests of those who object to supporting it; if
enough voters disagree with what government says, the next election will cancel the
message." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Justice Souter emphasized the distinction between activities funded by
general tax revenues and activities funded by targeted assessment, asserting that "the
particular interests of those singled out to pay the tax are closely linked with the
expression, and taxpayers who disagree with it suffer a more acute limitation on their
presumptive autonomy as speakers to decide what to say and what to pay for others to
say." Id.
155. Id. at 2071-72.
156. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., U.S. Supreme Court Rules that Beef
Checkoff Program is Constitutional (May 23, 2005), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/
!ut/p/ s.7 0 A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/05/0179.xm. Following the
Supreme Court's decision, Secretary Johanns remarked that "'[t]his is certainly a win for
the many producers who recognize the power of pooled resources. As this administration
has always contended, USDA regards such programs, when properly administered, as
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groups compelled to pay commodities checkoffs hoped that they would
be able to assert greater control over their checkoff dollars.5 7  A
challenge to a California commodities checkoff program for the
promotion of pistachios is currently being litigated in district court.1 8 At
effective tools for market enhancement."' Id.; see also Press Release, Cattlemen's Beef
Promotion & Research Bd., Supreme Court Confirms Constitutionality of Beef Checkoff
(May 23, 2005), http://www.beefboard.org/NEWSSupremeCourtConfirmsConstitutionality
OfBeefCheckoff21946.aspx. In response to the Supreme Court victory, Beef Board
Chairman Al Svajgr stated:
"[t]his is a victory for all cattlemen in the U.S ..... Now it is more critical than
ever that we come together as an industry to support the checkoff's educational,
research and promotional programs aimed at increasing demand for beef at
America's dining tables. We would call on the LMA [Livestock Marketing
Association] and WORC [Western Organization of Resource Councils] to join us
in these efforts, with an eye toward increasing long-term profitability for all
segments of our industry."
Id.; see also Michael Doyle, U.S. Can Compel Payment for Ads: Supreme Court Upholds
Fees on Farmers To Pay for Beef Promotion Campaign, MODESTO BEE, May 24, 2005, at
Al, 2005 WLNR 8238284 (heralding the Johanns decision as "a legal comeback for the
$45-million-a-year Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board").
157. See Peggy Steward, Court Upholds Beef Checkoff, CAPITAL PRESS AGRiC.
WKLY., May 27, 2005, http://www.capitalpress.info/main.asp?SectionlD=67&SubSection
ID=792&ArticlelD=17499&TM=34797. Following the Livestock Marketing Association's
Supreme Court defeat, Livestock Marketing Association president, Randy Patterson,
described checkoff litigation as an "'effort to give America's producers greater say over
how their checkoff dollars would be spent, and by whom."' Id. Patterson made the
following statement:
"We hope that message will not be lost with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, the Cattlemen's Beef Board and other beef industry leaders. We
hope they try and become more inclusive of differing views, and make sure that
producers large and small, and from every sector, have a greater voice in
checkoff affairs."
Id.
158. See Jon Ortiz, Grower Fights Marketing Plan, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 5, 2005, at
D2. Paramount Farms is the largest pistachio grower in California and sells its pistachios
under the Sunkist label. Id. It is attempting to enjoin the California Pistachio
Commission from compelling funding of "ineffective promotional programs." Id.
Paramount Farms has alleged that it was forced "to pay 'millions of dollars"' for checkoff-
funded advertising efforts it opposed. Id. The California Pistachio Commission "assesses
growers 3.25 cents per pound of harvested pistachios and uses the money for government
lobbying and generic industry ads." Id.
Other post-Livestock Marketing Ass'n checkoff cases are pending in the U.S. Court of
International Trade. Forrest Laws, Trade Court To Take Up Cotton Checkoff Lawsuits,
DELTA FARM PRESS, June 17, 2005, at 12, available at http://deltafarmpress
.com/mag/farming-trade-courtcotton/index.html. Over 100 cotton importers have filed
First Amendment challenges to USDA checkoffs adopted pursuant to the Cotton
Research and Promotion Act. Id. The U.S. Court of International Trade suspended
proceedings in the cotton cases pending the outcome of Livestock Marketing Ass'n. See id.
While the cotton checkoff initially applied only to domestic producers, cotton importers
must now pay the checkoff, which nets an estimated $60 million annually to fund
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this writing, however, there has been no successful as-applied challenge
to a commodities checkoff program post-Livestock Marketing Ass'n.'9
Despite the lack of a successful as-applied challenge, some limitation
on the government speech doctrine may be developing beyond the
commodities checkoff context.' 60 Both Congress and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) are concerned about video news releases
(VNRs) which are produced by the government, but not identified as
government speech. 16  Legislators and federal regulators are exploring
whether to enact disclosure requirements that will ensure that
broadcasters inform viewers of sponsor identity when the government is
subsidizing the report.1 62 In October 2005, the Senate Commerce
advertising and marketing efforts. Id. Some plaintiffs have requested class status, but, as
of this writing, the court has yet to make a determination. Id.
William P. Crawford, president and CEO of the Cotton Board, noted a distinction
between the cotton checkoff litigation and the beef checkoff at issue in Livestock
Marketing Ass'n:
"More than 100 importers filed lawsuits based on the freedom of speech
argument .... One importer filed an administrat[ive] case with USDA, but all of
the cases are similar, i.e., the checkoff program is unconstitutional based on the
First Amendment.
In the beef case, you had disgruntled producers and feedlot operations ....
In our case, only importers have filed actions. We haven't heard of a producer
who has intimated he was opposed to the checkoff program."
Id.
159. See News Release, Agric. Mktg. Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Judge Cites Supreme
Court and Upholds Two Commodity Boards (Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.ams.usda.gov
/news/218-05.htm. In September 2005, a USDA administrative law judge denied First
Amendment challenges to USDA Agricultural Marketing Service marketing orders for
producers of watermelons and honey. Id. Judge Jill Clifton ruled that, pursuant to
Livestock Marketing Ass'n, advertisements stemming from the Watermelon Research and
Promotion Act and the Honey Research, Promotion, and Consumer Information Act are
government speech not subject to First Amendment challenges. Id.; see also John Accola,
Judge Upholds Honey Fee: Beekeepers Said Checkoff a Violation of Free Speech, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Sept. 14, 2005, at 2B.
160. See, e.g., Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, S. 967, 109th Cong. § 342(a) (2005)
(illustrating a proposed amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 which would
require federal government-created prepackaged news stories to contain a clear
announcement that the government is the speaker).
161. S. REP. NO. 109-210, at 2 (2005).
162. See id. at 2-3. But see More Regulation of Video News Releases (VNRs), COMM.
DAILY, July 27, 2005, at 13, 13 (noting that the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB) and the Radio and Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) are strongly
opposed to the FCC's adoption of sponsorship identification rules for VNRs on freedom
of the press grounds, with RTNDA specifically stating that "such a requirement would
burden broadcasters and cable operators .... [and] would violate First Amendment rights
by dictating how VNRs are used").
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Committee approved the Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005,63 legislation
that would require the government to identify itself as the speaker when
it funds and produces VNRs.164 In addition, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has initiated its own inquiry into VNR production.
163. Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, S. 967, 109th Cong. (2005). The Truth in
Broadcasting Act is a measure to quash the proliferation under the Bush administration of
mock news segments produced by government agencies and aired by local broadcast
stations. S. Rep. No. 109-210, at 7-8; see also Toni Johnson & Eleanor Stables, S967 -
Truth in Broadcasting Act of 2005, CQ BILL ANALYSIS, Oct. 25, 2005, 2005 WLNR
17557221 ("Democratic lawmakers were outraged when federal prepackaged news stories
on the Medicare prescription drug program produced by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) were aired on local news stations with no indication of their true
origin.").
As instances of federal agency-sponsored "news" have come to national attention,
Secretary of Agriculture, Mike Johanns, and the USDA have again been the focus of
scrutiny, See Andrew Martin & Jeff Zeleny, USDA Plants Its Own News, CHI. TRIB., June
16, 2005, at 1. The USDA produced dozens of segments for television and radio broadcast
supporting the controversial Central American Free Trade Agreement. Id. The USDA's
efforts raised Democratic senators' hackles, including Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii)
and Senator Mary Landrieu (D-Louisiana), who wrote to Johanns to express their concern
that the segments, presented as news reports, were actually "'produced and distributed
with taxpayer dollars [and] provided to 675 rural radio stations and numerous televisions
[sic] stations where they are run, without disclosure of their source."' Id. (quoting a letter
to Secretary Johanns drafted by the senators). The senators further argued that listeners
could reasonably believe that the segments were "'news reports rather than political
statements from the USDA which are intended to advance a specific trade agenda."' Id.
164. S. 967 § 342(a); see also Johnson & Stables, supra note 163, at 17 (describing the
bill's disclosure requirements which "would instruct relevant agencies to include a clear
statement in their prepackaged news stories that the U.S. government prepared or funded
the story, but there would be no specific language mandated .... [and] would allow the
FCC to establish rules to determine when broadcasters and cable and satellite operators
could remove or alter the disclaimer").
165. See Request for Comments on the Use of Video News Releases by Broadcast
Licensees and Cable Operators, 70 Fed. Reg. 24,791, 24,791-93 (Apr. 13, 2005). Among
other issues, the FCC sought public comment regarding whether there were sufficient
"mechanisms in place to ensure that broadcast licensees and cable operators receive notice
regarding the identity of entities providing programming involving political material or the
discussion of controversial issues of public importance." Id. at 24,793.
In a separate statement, FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein expressed his
displeasure with the federal government, and made a point to remind broadcasters and
producers of content of the FCC sponsorship identification rules already in force:
We have recently received a large number of complaints from the public about
VNRs that were created by or for the federal government, and which were
broadcast on television stations without identifying the government's role in
developing the VNR. . . . [This] Public Notice is in response to these
developments, and reminds broadcast stations, cable operators, and others of
their disclosure obligations under our rules, if and when they choose to air
VNRs, and to reinforce that we will take appropriate enforcement action against
stations that do not comply with these rules.
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III. LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
In Livestock Marketing Ass'n, the government was finally able to
proffer a government speech argument in a checkoff case which the
Supreme Court was quick to accept."' But the majority's government
speech analysis is marked by three points of contention. First, the history
and structure of the beef checkoff indicates that a private entity, the Beef
Board, not the federal government, is speaking. '67 Second, the Livestock
Marketing Ass'n majority determined that when the government asserts
the government speech defense, it need not establish as a threshold
matter that it had clearly identified itself as the proponent of the speech
at issue.168 Third, in failing to find a difference between the compelled
subsidies at issue in Livestock Marketing Ass'n and the general taxes that
all Americans are required to pay, the majority ignored the inherent
vulnerability of dissenting groups like the Livestock Marketing
Association.1 69 Accordingly, the Supreme Court should refine its analysis
for determining what constitutes government speech so that, in order to
entertain an as-applied First Amendment challenge to a commodities
checkoff, a court must ask two threshold questions: (1) Who does the
It's high time for the FCC to remind broadcasters and others subject to our
sponsorship identification rules that they have a legal obligation to let their
viewers know when they run stories from someone else. People have a legal
right to know the real source when they see something on TV that is disguised as
"news."
Statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, to FCC Commissioner, Broadcast Licensees, Cable
Operators and Others on Requirements Applicable to Video News Releases and Seeks
Comment on the Use of Video News Releases by Broadcast Licensees and Cable
Operators (Apr. 13, 2005), http://www.hraunfoss.Fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-
05-84A3.pdf.
The FCC received eight comments by the June 22, 2005 initial comment filing deadline,
and two reply comments by the July 22, 2005 reply comment filing deadline. See Request
for Comments on the Use of Video News Releases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 24,791, FCC,
Electronic Comment Filing System [Enter Search Criteria], http://www.gullfoss2.fcc.gov
/prod/ecfs/comsrch-v2.cgi (type "05-171" under "1.Proceeding") (last visited Mar. 31,
2006).
166. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055, 2062-66 (2005).
167. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 4-5. The Livestock Marketing
Association pointed out that "[t]he Beef Act does not permit the United States
Government to fund any of the activities the Act authorizes. Accordingly, the program is
not subject to annual congressional review pursuant to the normal appropriations
process." Id. at 4 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2911 (2000)).
168. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2064-65 & 2064 n.7.
169. Id. at 2071-74 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[E]xpression that is not ostensibly
governmental, which government is not required to embrace as publicly as it speaks,
cannot constitute government speech sufficient to justify enforcement of a targeted
subsidy to broadcast it.").
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audience perceive to be the speaker?; and (2) Is the required
contribution at issue a targeted assessment?'7 °
A. The History and Structure of Checkoff Programs Lead to an Answer at
Odds with that of the Livestock Marketing Ass'n Majority
The facts of Livestock Marketing Ass'n suggest that while the Beef
Board was born of statute, it operates fundamentally as a private entity.'
Responsibility for checkoff collection belongs to state beef councils,
which are obligated to forward fifty cents per dollar to the Beef Board.'
72
A private entity collects the federal checkoff, not the federal
government, and checkoff money never passes through the United States
Treasury.'73  Thus, the checkoff requires private groups, the Livestock
Marketing Association, and other similar entities to pay another private
entity, the Beef Board, for an advertising campaign. 7 4 The Livestock
Marketing Association argued that the degree to which the federal
government is really involved in administering the beef checkoff is
minimal, contrary to Justice Scalia's suggestion. 17 If that is the case, then
170. See id. at 2068-74.
171. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 4; Cattlemen's Beef Promotion &
Research Bd., supra note 14. The Beef Board itself describes checkoffs as private
programs:
A checkoff is an industry-funded generic marketing and research program
designed to increase domestic and/or international demand for an agricultural
commodity.... These programs are similar to businesses funded by shareholders
Each checkoff program is supported entirely by its respective industry, which
could include U.S. producers, processors, handlers and importers. NO
TAXPAYER OR GOVERNMENT FUNDS ARE INVOLVED....
Checkoff programs are directed by industry-governed boards, appointed by
the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture. These boards are responsible for allocating
funds and approving business plans and programs, with USDA approval.
Id.
172. See Cattlemen's Beef Promotion & Research Bd., supra note 97. The
Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board succinctly describes checkoff collection:
The checkoff is collected by qualified state beef councils, which retain up to
50 cents on the dollar. The state councils forward the other 50 cents per head to
the Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board, which oversees the
national checkoff program, subject to USDA review. The 108 members of the
Cattlemen's Beef Board represent all segments of the beef industry, including
beef, veal and dairy producers and importers, and are nominated by industry




175. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2062-63. Justice Scalia asserted that
"[wihen, as here, the government sets the overall message to be communicated and
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the Livestock Marketing Ass'n majority has cloaked a private program
that is subject only to perfunctory government approval in the mantle of
government speech.76
Moreover, it is relevant that the checkoff program at issue in Livestock
Marketing Ass'n, is substantially similar to the checkoff programs that
gave rise to both Glickman and United Foods.7 7 In those cases, the
government speech defense either was not raised, or was raised at the
eleventh hour. 17 If the government truly believed the speech at issue was
government speech, why did it not raise the defense much earlier in the
protracted history of First Amendment challenges to checkoff programs?
B. Misleading Attribution
In his Livestock Marketing Ass'n dissent, Justice Souter did not dismiss
the validity of a government speech defense out of hand; indeed, he
recognized instances in which it was valuable.179 However, his dissent
appropriately asserted that in order to claim the defense, the government
must identify itself as the speaker clearly and unambiguously.'" While
the First Amendment rights of the dissenting livestock marketers were
primarily at issue in Livestock Marketing Ass'n, Justice Souter alluded to
an ancillary right: the right of the audience receiving an unimpeachable
approves every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the
government speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources in developing specific messages." Id. at 2063. However, the Livestock Marketing
Association suggested in its brief that private industry does much more than merely
"assist" the federal government:
USDA has no power to compose or select the messages on which checkoff
dollars are spent. Instead, private beef industry contractors submit promotion
proposals to the Operating Committee, which then selects among them. The
Secretary [of Agriculture's] role is simply to provide or withhold [his]
"approval," upon which the projects selected by the Committee "become
effective." In practice, such approval is pro forma, provided the project does not
fall outside the broad parameters of the Act; reflecting this pro forma role,
implementation of projects sometimes begins even before such approval. The
Annual Beef Industry Planning Cycle jointly developed by the Beef Board and
NCBA accordingly provides no role for USDA.
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 4-5 (citations omitted).
176. See supra note 41.
177. Compare Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2058-2059, with Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 460-63 (1997), and United States v. United Foods,
Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 408 (2001).
178. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2061 n.3; see also supra notes 62, 79 and
accompanying text.
179. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2068-70 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2068-69.
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message to be informed that the proponent of that message is the federal
government."'
Without a limiting principle, the government speech precedent of
Livestock Marketing Ass'n may prove dangerous over the long term.11 If
the government wishes to compel funding of a particular message that it
favors, all it needs do is create a checkoff-type program to be
administered by a like-minded interest group, and retain the right,
however pro forma, to approve the message. 8  Livestock Marketing
Ass'n does nothing to cure the attribution problem that so troubled
Justice Souter.'8 That "[F]unded By America's Beef Producers"
effectively means "Funded by the Federal Government" is ambiguous
attribution at best.1 85 If the government is clearly the speaker, then it
may appropriately plead the government speech defense.1 6  If the
government cannot successfully prove the threshold matter that a
reasonable person receiving the promotional message would observe that
the government is the sponsor of the message, then it must not be
permitted to take advantage of the government speech defense.
1 7
181. See id. at 2072-73; Lee, supra note 21, at 1052-55 (discussing how a "[r]easonable
[r]ecipient [s]tandard" would be instructive in government speech analyses).
182. See Tony Mauro, High Court Says Beef Is What's For Dinner, FIRST
AMENDMENT CTR., May 24, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?
id=15308. Thomas Goldstein, the Washington, D.C. attorney who represented the
Livestock Marketing Association before the Supreme Court, found the Supreme Court's
decision particularly odious in light of its broader implications, stating that the decision
"'is likely to be extremely significant for First Amendment jurisprudence, as it signals that
the government has a free hand not only to communicate its own views without oversight
by the courts but also to require financial support for that communication from a discrete
segment of the population."' Id. (quoting Thomas Goldstein).
183. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2062-63; id. at 2073 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
184. Id. at 2073-74 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. See id. at 2072; Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 8 ("In broadly limiting generic
advertising challenges, the court invigorated a 'government speech' doctrine that may
have consequences in a host of different contexts that the court and the bar right now can
only dimly perceive."). In response to the Supreme Court's Livestock Marketing Ass'n
decision, Institute for Justice lawyer Steve Simpson remarked that "'[t]he First
Amendment protects the right to dissent as much as the right to speak . ...
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has just made it a lot easier for government to compel
support for the "party line" in a particular industry, and drown out any dissent."' Mauro,
supra note 99, at 12 (quoting Steve Simpson).
186. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2068 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his
Livestock Marketing Ass'n dissent, Justice Souter espoused "the view that if government
relies on the government-speech doctrine to compel specific groups to fund speech with
targeted taxes, it must make itself politically accountable by indicating that the content
actually is a government message." Id. at 2069.
187. See id. at 2073-74; Lee, supra note 21, at 1052-55. That the Supreme Court must
clearly define the limits of the government speech doctrine is made all the more pointed
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C. Missing the Distinction: A Compelled Subsidy May Burden First
Amendment Interests, While a General Tax May Not
The Livestock Marketing Ass'n majority also failed to give adequate
weight to the fact that targeted assessments differ from general tax
revenues in that only specific individuals must pay targeted assessments,
and the government uses them for a particular purpose.'8 The Supreme
Court must permit those compelled to fund private speech via targeted
assessments to raise a First Amendment challenge 89 As Justice Kennedy
warned in his United Foods majority opinion, "First Amendment values
are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a
discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side
that it favors."'9 Targeted assessments are fundamentally different from- 191
general taxes; individuals who object to messages funded by general tax
revenues need not have standing to challenge laws indirectly compelling
them to subsidize messages with which they disagree.' 92
In Livestock.Marketing Assn, Justice Scalia suggested that permitting
a First Amendment challenge in a checkoff case would open the
floodgates, so that any person who pays taxes but disagrees with a
resulting government message, no matter how indirectly related to the
individual's contribution, could refrain from funding that message.' 93 But
Justice Souter's dissent articulated a middle ground that is far less
offensive to the Constitution.94  Because those forced to pay targeted
by the fact that Chief Justice John Roberts is intimately familiar with the defense, having
advocated in its favor in both Rust and Livestock Marketing Ass'n v. United States
Department of Agriculture, the precursor case to the Supreme Court's Livestock Marketing
Ass'n. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 176, 192-94 (1991); Livestock Marketing Ass'n v.
U.S. Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 713, 717 (8th Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Livestock
Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055. Some comments that Chief Justice Roberts made during
October 2005 oral arguments may indicate that he is prepared to seriously consider, and
may even have a preference for, broadly affirming the government speech defense. See
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Grapple with Whether Public Employees Enjoy Free-Speech
Rights on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at A19 (noting that during oral arguments in
a state employee whistle-blowing case, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that counsel for
the state "'might have argued that because the speech was paid for by the government, it
was government speech and the First Amendment did not apply at all"' (quoting Chief
Justice John Roberts)).
188. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2071 & n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2071-72.
190. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001).
191. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2071 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192. See id.
193. See id. at 2063-64 (majority opinion).
194. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 37; Gershengorn, supra note 8, at
8. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the Livestock Marketing Association asserted that
limitation on the use of the government speech doctrine would not swallow the defense:
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assessments are more likely to suffer direct harm, only they may raise a
First Amendment challenge.'95
The Supreme Court has left the door open to an as-applied challenge
to a checkoff program. 196 Thus, it is possible that the Court will have the
opportunity to more carefully balance the concerns of the federal
government against the concerns of those who are compelled to fund
speech with which they disagree. 197  By reconsidering the distinction
between targeted assessments and general tax revenues and by
considering whether an audience could reasonably perceive that the
government is speaking, the Court may incorporate the Souter approach
to a compelled subsidies analysis without jettisoning the government
speech doctrine completely. 198
[T]he First Amendment scrutiny that respondents urge would leave intact
government's ability to compel support in appropriate ways for the costs of
government speech. Even beyond the plainly permissible use of general tax
revenues, some targeted mandatory assessments designed to support government
speech could almost certainly withstand the applicable level of First Amendment
scrutiny, or even escape such scrutiny altogether.
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 37.
Analyzing the use of cigarette sales to fund federally sponsored antismoking advertising
efforts, the respondents concluded:
A principal difference between such taxes and the beef checkoff is that,
whereas Beef Act promotions are expressly attributed to producers, few viewers
would attribute anti-smoking ads . . . to smokers, the parties upon whom
cigarette taxes are normally assessed. And even if such a tax were assessed on
the cigarette companies rather than on the smokers, the public still would not
attribute the message to the companies, inasmuch as that message is
transparently against their interests.
Id. at 38.
195. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2071 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
a message funded by a targeted assessment limits the expressive autonomy of those who
pay the assessment and that this expressive autonomy is further-and unduly-burdened
when the government dissembles or deflects responsibility for the message on to
dissenters).
196. See id. at 2065 (majority opinion). Such a challenge would stem from a scenario
similar to the following: a commodity producer who pays a targeted assessment disagrees
with the content of a generic promotional message that appears in advertisements funded
by the checkoff. Id. at 2066 (Thomas, J., concurring). But members of the audience who
receive the promotional message believe that the dissenter is a proponent of the message,
perhaps because it is attributed generically to all producers of that commodity. See id. As
a result of this mistaken attribution, some unnamed harm results. See id.
197. See Martin A. Schwartz, Generic Beef Advertising Ruled 'Governmental Speech,'
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17, 2005, at 3, 9 ("The Court left open whether the attribution could form
the basis for an argument that as-applied, the government is requiring compelled subsidy
of private speech in violation of the First Amendment.").
198. See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2070-74 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Souter articulated the rationale behind the government speech
doctrine, which defines the appropriate scope of its use:
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IV. CONCLUSION
While it is settled law that the government cannot compel individuals
and organizations to fund purely private speech with which they disagree,
commodities checkoffs remain in jurisprudential limbo. In Livestock
Marketing Ass'n, the Supreme Court attempted to solve the checkoff
conundrum of Glickman and United Foods, settling ultimately on an
escape hatch - the government speech doctrine - that only begets further
confusion. If promotional messages funded by targeted commodities
checkoffs are tantamount to government speech, the Supreme Court
must require the government to identify itself. By reexamining Justice
Souter's Livestock Marketing Ass'n dissent, the Supreme Court can
incorporate principles of transparency and fiscal fairness into the nascent
government speech doctrine.
The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly
imprecise.... Even at this somewhat early stage of development, however, two
points about the doctrine are clear.
The first point of certainty is the need to recognize the legitimacy of
government's power to speak despite objections by dissenters whose taxes or
other exactions necessarily go in some measure to putting the offensive message
forward to be heard. To govern, government has to say something, and a First
Amendment heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the
government's voice in the "marketplace of ideas" would be out of the question.
The second fixed point of government-speech doctrine is that the First
Amendment interest in avoiding forced subsidies is served, though not
necessarily satisfied, by the political process as a check on what government
chooses to say.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
